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ABSTRACTThe purpose of this article is to call for the formulation and adoption of a declaration on the universal rights and duties of business. We do not attempt to define the specific contents of such a declaration, but rather attempt to explain why such a declaration is needed and what would be some of its general characteristics. The catalyst for this call was the recognition that even under optimal conditions, good companies sometimes are susceptible to moral lapses, and when companies undertake ventures in authoritarian countries with poor human rights records, even those with the best intentions may find themselves drawn into complicity in human rights abuses. There, market exigencies may persuade them to leave their codes of ethics and commitments to human rights at home. Pragmatism, it would seem, requires thatthey accept the ethical inconsistencies that follow from a "When in Rome, do as they Romans do" outlook. When facing the moral dilemma about whether or not to invest in human rights abusing countries, companies are offered two alternatives: they can operate in those countries and accept potential complicity or they can stay away. We suggest, however, that a preferable option is to address the underlying problem, and to this end we advocate the promulgation of a declaration for business that is comparable to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Our proposed name for this is the "Declaration on the Universal Rights and Duties of Business." To be effective, such a declaration would require enforcement mechanisms. To illustrate this issue, we focus on China, not because China is unique in its human rights abuses, but because China occupies such a central place in the globalization efforts of the major companies from around the world. A robust international declaration is needed to provide a common framework for the practice of consistent and fair business competition everywhere.

AbstractRecent research has highlighted the importance of cultivating the ethical climate of a firm with implications for ethical decision making and consumer confidence. However, there are important lessons still to be gleaned from firms responsible for generating ethical failures. Based on a case study of the Sanlu melamine milk powder scandal in China, this article analyzes the key factors that have affected consumer confidence in Sanlu and highlights main reasons for Chinese consumers' continued distrust of state dairy enterprises. We explore the causes of business distrust in the Sanlu case from the perspective of Chinese product consumers. We further recommend solutions to repair a crisis of consumer confidence and trust in the domestic dairy industry by considering these stakeholders' perspectives.

The fifth edition of Business Ethics addresses current, intriguing, often complex issues in corporate morality through 53 readings and 30 pertinent case studies. Now significantly updated, it includes new leading articles, related current cases, and mini-cases based on MBA student dilemmas.Addresses a broad range of the most current, intriguing, often complex issues and cases in corporate moralityProvides impartial, point-counterpoint presentations of different perspectives on the most important and highly contended issues of business ethicsUpdated and significant case studies are included to

ABSTRACTManuscript Type:EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue:We examine recent SEC regulations that are intended to increase the independence of mutual fund compliance officers.Research Findings/Insights:The new SEC regulations require mutual fund compliance officers to report directly to the board of directors. The board is also now responsible for hiring/firing, and for approving the compliance officer's compensation. After a literature review and a survey of compliance officers and mutual fund board members, we conclude that SEC Rule 38a‐1 represents a positive step toward increasing compliance officer independence in the mutual fund industry in the United States.Theoretical/Academic Implications:The direct reporting relationship established by Rule 38a‐1 between mutual fund compliance officers and boards of directors sets the industry apart from corporate America, in general, where compliance/ethics officers typically report to management. We assert that the increased board involvement in ethics and compliance‐related matters that results from the new SEC regulations allows mutual fund boards to govern more effectively.Practitioner/Policy Implications:We contend that the SEC and other international regulators could improve independence and corporate governance even further if they required mutual fund compliance officers to be totally independent of management, by not allowing them to be employees of investment adviser companies.